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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOCAL OPTION LAWS.
WHAT is the nature of legislative power-when is it exercised-
and when is it delegated-are the questions which are suggested
by this. popular phrase.
It has always been esteemed fundamental that legislative power
could not be delegated.
The New York school law, which submitted to the popular vote
of the whole state whether it should be in force or not, was many
years ago held to be unconstitutional, as delegating the legislative
power: Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483. But as multitudes of
acts of the legislature have been almost from time immemorial
submitted to the people of towns, counties, &c., and their vote
allowed to determine whether the act should be in force or not,
and yet held to be constitutional, the proposition that a law is
constitutional if it gives a "local option," has been stoutly asserted.
The New Jersey act recently construed by the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, is a good example of a local option law: see
State v. Morris Common Pleas, ante, p. 32. It consists of eight
sections. Section one "authorizes and requires the voters of
the town of Chatham to determine by ballot whether any person
shall thereafter be licensed to sell liquor in Chatham." Section two
provides for the details of the election, and directs the return to
be of "an election to determine whether licenses shall be granted
to sell liquor." Section three directs that the ballots to be voted
shall contain nothing but "License" or "No License." Sections
VOL. XXI.-9
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four and five provide the length of notice, and require a biennial
vote "upon the question of license or no license." Section six en-
acts "that if at the election a majority of all the votes cast shall be
'No License,' it shall not thereafter be lawful to license any person
to sell liquor in Chatham until it shall be so decided by a majority
of legal votes cast at some subsequent election." Section seven
enacts that it shall not be lawful to sell liquor in Chatham without
license, and any person so offending shall be fined. Section eight
repeals all inconsistent acts.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently held this act to
be no delegation of the legislative power. A similar act has since
been held in Massachusetts to be a delegation of this power.
The question is one of general importance, for the Constitution
of every state in the Union is in this respect identical; every one
providing that the legislative power shall be vested in the two
houses of the legislature. The Constitution of the United States
also provides that "all legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress."
The first thing that is necessary to be understood is, what is
legislative power. Mr. Bentham tells us that every one under-
stands by this, "the power of commanding." It is generally
understood to mean the power of making laws. Blackstone
tells us what laws are-they are rules; not orders to or concern-
ing a particular person: they are not recommendations or advice
-nor do they depend upon the subject's approbation.
To rightly consider the question we must distinctly keep in
remembrance that all acts of the legislature are not laws. All
acts of Parliament are not laws. 3lackstone tells us this. We
must also remember that the legislatures of our states possess a
vast mass of power which is not legislative. So does Congress.
The power to declare war, to borrow money and to coin money,
are not purely legislative powers. They are exercised by and
under the forms of laws, resolutions or acts; but declaring war
and coining money were powers belonging to the Crown-the Exe-
cutive-at common law. Congress, however, has only such powers
as are granted it. But by the theory of our system, a state legis.
lature represents the people; and at the Revolution became pos-
sessed, without constitutional grant, of all the powers of govern-
ment which were republican which the Crown or Parliament before
possessed. So that at this day the state legislatures are possessed
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af all the powers of the Crown and all the powers of Parliament
which a republican government may properly possess, and whien
the State Constitution does not prohibit or otherwise vest, or the
National Constitution does not vest in the National Government.
All the powers of the legislature are sovereign, but all are not
legislative. The power to tax is a sovereign power; the legisla-
ture' has it, but, as Lord Chatham a century ago told us, it is not
a purely legislative power. Corporations-public and private-
created by the Crown, without legislative sanction, have always
had the power of taxing their members to carry out the purposes
of the corporation; and the members of a public corporation may
comprise the whole population of a city.
The modern strict construction of corporate powers may limit
this power; but it does not show that the power is legislative in
its nature; it shows, at most, that it is a sovereign power. The
power to create corporations is not a legislative power. The
power to create public corporations, and endow them with vast
powers of local government, was a power of the Crown-and was
therefore esteemed an executive and not a legislative power.
For this reason it has been universally held-there is not a
single case to the contrary-that when a city is incorporated by an
act of the legislature, the act may be submitted to the people-to
be in force if they approve it, and to be void if they disapprove
it. It is held to be a grant of privileges which the legislature-
not as the law-maker, but as the possessor of the sovereign power
of providing for the government of the people-may grant. As
a law-maker the legislature does not make grants; it makes
rules-laws.
The public corporations created by the Crown had the power
of making by-laws and ordinances and rules for the government
of the people within the territory of the town or city. This
would seem to be a legislative power; but none of such by-laws
or ordinances or rules ever had the effect or force of laws. They
were required to be reasonable, and were subject to the control
of the courts, and could be set aside on a trial at common law, or
on certiorari.
Rules of court are rules; but they are not laws, for they ar"
made by, and of course are subject to, the power of the judiciary.
It is essential to a valid law that the judiciary shall be boand to
cbey/ it-and shall have no power to a~oid it or repeal it.
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Acts of the legislature, granting land or franchises, creating
corporations public or private, uniting towns, dividing counties,
erecting educational institutions, locating court-houses, &c.,
though submitted to the people, have been universally held valid.
They were either grants of property or privileges which did not
proceed from the legislative power of the legislature, but from
other sovereign powers held by it, and therefore properly offered
to the grantee to accept or reject; or, as in the instance of the
location of a court-house, determinations upon single administra-
tive acts which could be determined upon by the legislature or
the people, without either the people or the legislature exercising
legislative power.
Judge STORY tells us, in 11 Peters 603, that an act of the legis-
lature may be a grant, though it have the form of a law. These
acts of the legislature, though they have the form of laws, are not
necessarily laws.
A legislature grants and exercises all its functions, by and in
the form of resolves, acts, statutes or laws. Because an act has
the form of a law, that does not determine that it is a law. A
law must prescribe rules. It may be said, with truth, that some
of these acts are both grants and 'laws; and it may fairly be
asked, if the grant-part takes effect does not the law-part depend
upon the grant, the grant upon the acceptance, the acceptance
upon the vote, and so the law upon the vote ?
This in a sense may be so, and yet no objection to the law.
The dependency of an act upon a.con tingency is no objection to it.
But when the law is made to depend upon a contingency of such a
character as to demonstrate that the manifest object of it is to
leave to the people to determine what the rule of law shall be, it
is plain that the legislature means to give to them the legislative
power.
Courts are bound to hold that the manifest object, and no
other, is accomplished, if it can be constitutionally; and if it can-
not, that nothing is accomplished, the law being void as unconsti-
tutional.
But where another and a distinct and clear object may be
plainly accomplished by making an act depend upon a contin-
gecy-as the people's vote-the courts have no right to hold thac
the manifest oject is different from the other distinct and cleaz
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object, and merely to leave to the people to determine what the
rule shall be.
There is such other distinct, clear object when the same act
contains a grant of corporate existence and an enactment of rules
for the government of the new artificial being, and of the people
who are to compose that artificial being. Certainly one plain and
palpable object of such reference to the people is to permit them
to determine whether their situation and circumstances shall be
changed, as they always are, by their incorporation. The rules for
the government of a people are and ought to be controlled by such
circumstances, and be dependent upon a due consideration of
them. Every court will determine that the rules are so depend-
ent, unless forced by the most cogent proofs to decide that the
intention is to make them depend upon the will of the people.
The legislature may, confessedly, permit the existence of these
- circumstances to depend upon the will of the people; yet it by no
means follows that giving to the people power to change their cir-
cumstances-and making rules in anticipation of the change, to
apply to the anticipated circumstances only-is giving the people
power to make these rules, though the rules will not apply unless
the people choose to change their circumstances. The court
will attribute the rules to legitimate and constitutional mo-
tives-the change of circumstnces-a motive which exists and is
apparent on the face of the law, and not to an illegitimate and
unconstitutional motive which does not appear. They will, there-
fore, hold that the object of the submission of the act to the people
was not to leave to them the making of the rules, but to leave tc
them a mere choice as to their being incorporated or not.
But it may be asked, What becomes of the law-part of such an
act if the grant-part is not accepted ?
The answer is, it is immaterial what becomes of it. If the
manifest object of leaving such an act to the people to say
whether it be valid or void, is not to part with legislative power;
it is not parted with.
Yet there is another clear answer. The law-part of such an
act stands just as all laws do which provide for beings or per-
sons who never come into the territory where the laws are to pre-
vail, and which are silent only for -want of a subject on which to
operate.
The new powers, rights and privileges not being accepted, and
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consequently the artificial being which was the subject of the law-
part, never coming into existence, the rules or laws for the govern-
ment of the proposed artificial being, and of the people who, in
new relations to each other, were to compose the artificial being,
are inapplicable to any existing state of things, and have nothing
on which to operate.
Such acts of the legislature have never in a single instance
been held to be a delegation of the legislative power. The
ground upon which they have been held to be valid is, that they
are grants of grantable privileges which, though granted by the
legislature, do not arise out of that portion of its power which
is law-making, unless where the act is a grant and law. In that
case the law-part is held to depend upon a legitimate and consti-
tutional motive-the change of circumstances produced by the
acceptance of the grant. If the grant-part is not accepted the
law-part is held to stand only in the same condition in which all
laws do where a proposed subject of them never comes within the
sphere of their action, as before explained.
But it has been said that acts may be passed by the legislature,
which are not to be laws except by the sanction and allowance of
some other body than the legislature. This is not said, but de-
nied, in the K:ew Jersey case and an earlier case in Vermont.
While denying the proposition that'laws may be so made, both or
these cases seem to us to affirm it, though not in terms.
An act of the legislature which prescribes rules is a law. But
suppose the legislature prescribes as a rule that a county court,
under certain restrictions, in its discretion shall grant or refuse
to citizens applying for it, a license to exercise a certain privi-
lege.; and afterwards, by another act, enacts that the people of a
town shall determine whether any licenses shall be granted by the
same court; and if they determine that licenses shall not be
granted, that then the court shall not grant any licenses in that
town-is this a law prescribed by the legislature or by the people ?
Assume that the legislature does enact the new rule, does it not
so enact it that it is plain that it is not the intent of the law-maker
to make it a rule, unless and until that very same rule shall have
other sanction and allowance than that of the legislature itself?
Laws may, beyond a doubt, be made to take effect on a contin-
gency The New Jersey court sustains the constitutionality of
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the Chatham law, on the ground that it is a law depending on a
nere contingency.
The court assent in the fullest manner to the general principle,
thus:-
"It must be conceded that this law can have no sanction if it
is a delegation of the law-making power to the people of the
town." * * * "It is also obvious that it is not competent to
delegate to the people the right to say whether an existing law
sball be repealed or its operation suspended."
"1 If it is left to the contingency of a popular vote to pronounce
whether it shall take effect, it is not the will of the law-makers,
but the voice of their constituents, which moulds the rule of
action. If the vote is affirmative, it is law; if in the negative,
it is not law. The vote makes or defeats the law, and thus the
people are permitted unlawfully to resume the right of which they
have divested themselves by written constitution-to declare by
their own direct action what shall be law." * * * *
"The test will be whether this enactment, when it passed from
the hands of the lawgiver, had taken the form of a complete law.
It denounces as a misdemeanor the selling of liquor without
license. So far it is positive and free from any contingency."
"It left to the popular vote to determine not whether it should
be lawful to sell liquor without license, but whether the contin-
°gency should arise under which license might be granted;" it
might have been added, "or should not be granted."
Of this we observe: the court seem to have lost sight of the
provision of the sixth section, "that if a majority should vote ' no
license' it should not be lawful to license any person to sell
liquor."
By a previous law it was lawful for the Court of Common Pleas
to grant licenses in its discretion, but each applicant was obliged
to procure the recommendation of ten reputable freeholders.
But we desire more particularly to consider the proposition of
the court, that as the law left only to the people to determine
whether the contingency should arise under which licenses might
be granted it did not amount to a delegation of legislative power.
If the legislature by this law did leave it " to the popular vote
to determine * * * * " whether the contingency should arise
CC under which licenses might be granted," it may have granted
to the people its power to make a law, or it may not.
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It seems to us, that whether it did or not, must depend upon
what the contingency was which the people were to determine.
3t may be the very contingency which it is the whole function of
the legislature to determine.
The legislature in the enactment of every law determines a
contingency. That contingency is whether the rule shall be to
this effect or to that effect. The court say the legislature left it
to the popular vote to determine whether the contingency should
arise under which licenses might be granted. Literally taken,
this would leave to the popular vote whether a majority should
vote in the affirmative "License."
There is some obscurity in the expression of the court; for
when a popular vote is permitted, it is to determine some other
question than merely whether a majority shall vote a ballo- super-
scribed "Yes" or "No," "License" or "No License,"-it must
be to determine that which is expressed by the ballot. Here,
what was intended to be expressed is that which is left by the law
to be determined by the vote, "whether licenses should be granted
by the Court of Common Pleas ;" and so the court doubtless
intended to be understood.
The law expressly "authorizes and requires the vote to deter-
mine whether license should be granted." This is the contin-
gency which the law left to the popular vote to determine.
Licenses could be granted only by authority of the old law. All
licenses could be prevented from being granted only by a new
law.
For the legislature to determine that they should be granted,
would leave the old law as it was. For the legislature to de-
teimine that they should not be granted by the court at all,
would alter the old law. Yet the legislature did not determine
ihat they should not be granted by' the court. It left to the
popular vote the determination of that, question. In other words,
thelegislature, without determining either that they should or should
not, enacted that if the people should determine that licenses
should not be granted, licenses should not be granted. Without
determining this very contingency the legislature could not legis-
late. It was a contingency necessary to be determined previous
to legislation. The determination was a necessary step towards
and in legislative action. Without determining it the legislature
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could ixt execute its function. It never did determine it, and
therefore did not legislate.
The court add, "the operation of the old act is not suspended
by the vote, but the new act modifies the old act."
There is no question that the new act does everything. The
only question is, whether the legislature, without parting with its
legislative power, can, in advance of its knowledge as to what the
voters will determine, enact that the old law shall be modified or
not, as the voters shall in future determine.
Does it in such case exercise its legislative power; or does it
give it up to the voter, and say, in effect, "the legislature does
not know what it wants the law to be, or what its will is ?" Does
it not leave the voter to say what his will is; and itself say,
"whatever your will shall turn out to be-the legislature having
no choice or will on the subject at all, and caring nothing about
exercising its own function on the subject-declares shall be its
will ;" and thereby enacts-it knows not what.
Surely thus enacting-it knows not what-is not legislation by
the legislature. It is merely authorizing others to legislate. But
the court holds that as the legislature may confessedly, as it did
by the old law, require a recommendation of ten freeholders, it
may, upon the same principle, require a recommendation of the
majority of the voters of the town; that this may be expressed
by a vote; and as the court cannot license under the old act,
without the recommendation of ten freeholders, it cannot license
under the new law without thg vote of the majority.
The court say, "the only difference is, that under the new law
the majority express their judgment as to all the applications in
gross, while under the general law the ten freeholders act upon
them in detail."
But there are many differences. Under the old law the ten.
merely recommend-which is advice, and never a law. If they
do not recommend, their non-action is not legislation. Non-
action cannot be legislation.
Under the new law the people "determine whether any licenses
shall be granted." A determination by the people or the legisla-
ture, that they may be granted by the court, is not a recommen-
lation or advice, but if it has any force it is a law.
This determination will not make a new law only because it
loes not contradict the old law.
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But the people are authorized to determine that licenses shall
not be granted. A determination that they shall not be granted
is not recommendation or advice, but a command-and this is the
language of laws. The freeholders act on the application in de-
tail. The voters act on them in gross. Action on a subject in
detail is not legislation. But action on applications in gross.
commanding that they shall not be granted, is laying down a
rule.
Legislation is making rules, and therefore must operate on things
in gross. The action of the freeholders on an application iays down
no rule for the court to enforce or conform to. The action of the
people on all applications in gross, determining they shall not be
granted, is a determination of what shall be the rule to be observed
by the court on all applications. The making of a recommenda-
tion that A. shall be licensed, is not the making of a rule ; it
applies but to one person. The making of the recommendation,
is not the making of a rule, but it is necessary, by virtue of
a rule that every applicant's petition shall be so recommended;
and this rule is prescribed by the legislature. The making of the
determination that no licenses shall be granted is the making of
a rule; for that applies to every applicant's case. The making
of this rule by the people is necessary under the new act; and it
is necessary by virtue of a rule prescribed by the legislature; but
the difference in the two cases is this : the legislature can author-
ize the making of a recommendation by others; but it cannot
authorize the making of rules by others, if such rules are to
have the force of laws. If it authorizes others to make rules
which are to have the force of laws, it parts with the power which
is vested in it alone.
It is said that the voters express their judgment by their vote
as the freeholders did theirs by their recommendation; but tho
voters do not express a judgment when they vote "No license,'
they express their will that licenses shall not be granted. It is
the language of command. The legislature says it shall be a
command, that it shall have the force, not of a judgment or de-
cree, but of a law; "the court shall not grant licenses if the
people so determine."
The New Jersey court, however, supports such a law on the
further ground that it is an authority to a township to make ordi-
nances. The right of the legislature to grant powers of local
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government is conceded universally. But the right does not pr(
ceed from the legislature's legislative power, but. from that mas
of powers which a state legislature, as representative of the pec
ple of the state, possesses, as before explained, and all its powcr,
except those which are legislative, are better exerted and almos
necessarily exerted by subordinate bodies.
There is a sort of legislative power granted when a municipal
corporation is created ; for the mere incorporation authorizes by-
laws and ordinances. Yet these subordinate legislative powers,
though they are in a sense legislative, are not so in the sense of
any state constitution.
The by-laws and ordinances made under these grants are rules,
but not laws. They are a sort of laws, but not real laws. The
judiciary superintends them, and declares them void for unrea-
sonableness. We do not propose to discuss the question how far
acts of the legislature which give this subordinate power, revisable
by the judiciary, to the people, may go, but the legislature cannot,
it seems to us, give such force to the ordinances, rules, by-laws or
determinations of the people in the nature of rules, as to exempt
them from the control of the judiciary. Any greater force will
be the force of law.
The legislature itself and alone can give the force of law to a
rule. It cannot authorize another to make a rule, having the
force of a law.
But there are considerations suggested by Chief Justice RED-
FIELD, in his opinion in State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 356, which are very
weighty, and they appear to him to be so strong to show that
legislative power may, in many instances, depend upon the will of
another, that he concludes his very able opinion with the remark:
"If these illustrations are not sufficient to show the fallacy of
the argument, more would not avail."
His first suggestion is, that "the legislatures have the power
to alter county and town lines and the place of holding courts;
but legislation upon these subjects is made to con'form as far as
practicable to the supposed wishes of those interested, and nume-
rous statutes upon these important subjects, whose binding force
has never been questioned, have in terms been made to depend
for their whole force and vitality upon the future contingency of
the expressed and recorded vote of those interested."
We have but to consider that what is called legislation here, is
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not an exercise of the power of making rules. The location of
a county or town line, or of a county court-house, is a question
of administration. A single act of public administration is to
be performed, and the law-making power is not exerted in deter-
mining the location, for no rule is necessary to be made on the
subject.
One thing is to be done-that is done by a simple order which
has no characteristic of a law. It is true, the same body which
possesses the legislative power exercises those powers of adminis-
tration, but they are not legislative powers.
Again, it is said, " Congress passes laws almost every session.
whose operation is made contingent upon the revenue laws of
foreign states, or their navigation laws or regulations, and upon
a hundred other uncertainties, more or less affected by the will
or agency of voluntary beings or communities, and in most of
these cases the suspension or operation of the enactment depends
ultimately, perhaps, on the mere will and agency of our execu-
tive government ; and of the perfect regularity and constitution-
ality of such enactments, no question was ever made."
This is all true, except that which alleges that the suspension
or operation of the enactment depends upon the will of our ex-
ecutive. The executive is never left to its own will in such
matters.
Again: "One may find any number of cases in the legislation
of Congress, where statutes have been made dependent on the
shifting character of the revenue laws, or the navigation laws or
commercial rules, edicts or restrictions of other countries. In
some, perhaps, these laws are made by representative bodies, or
it may be by the people of these states, and in others by the lords
of the treasury, or the boards of trade, or by the proclamation
of the sovereign, and yet no question can be made of the legality
of these laws, though dependent on these contingencies."
All these things, however, are "regulations of commerce with
foreign nations."
It might well be contended that if Congress had no legislative
power whatever, it might do every one of these things; for it
has an express grant of a power "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations," and as Chief Justice REDFIELD says, the only
possible method of "regulating foreign commerce" is to make
our regulations dependent upon the edicts, laws, restrictions and
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOCAL OPTION LAWS.
acts of other states, and of the people of other states. If this
is the only possible method of regulating foreign commerce, and
Congress has express power to regulate it, it may do all these
things under this express power, without affording any demon-
stration that these regulations are made in exercise of a simple
legislative power, and that therefore laws may be made dependent
for their existence on any contingency. Indeed, Chief Justice
REDFIELD himself says, every contingency must be an equal and
fair one-a moral and a legal one-and so far connected with the
object and purpose of the statute as not to be. a mere idle and
arbitrary one. This is a qualification much greater than we shall
insist upon.
But in truth, all these laws of Congress are legitimate exer-
cises of legislative power, though depending upon the contingen-
cies mentioned.
It has often been said that a law cannot be made to depend
upon the will of any other than the legislative power. But this
is too broad. What is meant is, that a law, a rule laid down,
cannot be made by the legislative body where the legislative body,
in pretending to make it or lay it down, makes it in such terms
that it is the plain intention of the legislative body that it shall
not be law unless the very same law receives the sanction and
allowance of some other than itself.
There is a sense in which all laws depend upon the will of
others than the will of the legislator. No one will be obnoxious
to the penalty of a law or be entitled to its reward, unless he
wills to do the thing upon the doing of which the statute de-
nounces the penalty or promises the reward. It is plainly not
the intention of the' legislative body in such cases to ask for its
law the approbation of the subject of its law, but to command'
and exact the obedience of the subject.
. This is the test-does the legislature ask the approbation of
the subject or of any one else before the law shall bind, or does
it command his obedience to the law?
The laws of Congress, which are referred to by Chief Justice
REDFIELD, are dependent upon the will of the foreigner-the laws.
edicts, orders and acts of foreign states, their officers and people-
only in this sense. "If you will to do this, if you enact that-
if you declare, proclaim or order the other-this shall be the law
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that we will enforce." But in dealing with our own people, wo
make laws which depend upon their overt acts.
As it would be unjust to make commercial regulations against
a whole nation because of the isolated acts of a single subject.
we do not consider the act of one foreigner to be the act of the
nation whose conduct it is the object of our regulations to bind
and control; and therefore our laws describe and'provide against
not the acts of individual foreigners, but the will of the nation,
expressed by its laws, edicts, orders or accredited public acts.
Our commercial regulations are not, "1 if a single foreigner
shall do so and so, thus and so our officers shall treat him ;" but,
"if the nation wills so, enacts so, issues such orders, proclama-
tions, or having them already, continues them in force, thus and
so shall our officers treat the whole nation." Do such provisions,
does such reference to the will, the laws, declarations and orders
of a foreign power by Congress show any intention that our laws
shall not be in force unless the foreign nation shall give its sanc-
tion and allowance to the same rules which we establish against
them ?
Their approval of our laws is the last thing we expect of them.
We do not leave to them to establish the same rule we establish;
and declare, that until they do, our rule shall not be put in force.
We put it in force designedly against their will, and to coerce
their will and their conduct, to alter their regulations. Their
assent to our rules would be idle, nugatory and absurd. Our rule
is penal, and against them.
They could not assent to the rules we lay down for our people
to treat them harshly. We do not permit them to assent to them;
for it would be an assertion of jurisdiction 6ver our territory and
officers. They would be declaring hostility against themselves to
re-enact our laws against them. We make them so that it will
be impossible for them to assent to them-to induce them to alter
their conduct outside of our jurisdiction.
Is this giving up our legislative power over our own territory ?
Is it not indirectly extending it, instead of handing ourselves over
to them and their will, and saying, "we enact this or that, which-
ever you like best, whichever you say shall be the rule."
This would be a delegation of our legislative power. But what
we do say to them is this: "We enact! this in the United States,
because you have enaoted that in your territory." We do not
